While unrepresentable and incommunicable, the 'experience' of trauma is held to find displaced expression not only in these psycho-somatic symptoms but also in forms of testimony and other cultural representations in literature, film, art and the media. 'Trauma analysis' of such representations in the Humanities has tended to take its lead from Caruth's oft-quoted argument that trauma is 'more than a pathology or a simple illness of a wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available'. 9 Manifesting in this way an 'impossible history' that 'they cannot entirely possess', 10 utterances of the traumatised subject call for acts of listening and witnessing whereby 'some testimony can be made to trauma's "traceless traces"', in
an 'act of "recovery"' that represents traumatic experience of the event whilst 'acknowledg(ing) the gaps and absences' in memory and representation. 11 Radstone identifies a number of theoretical problems with academic discussion of trauma conducted on these terms, which tend to be overlooked when the value of trauma theory becomes taken for granted. 12 I will focus here on three of these problems. Firstly, in understanding the 'wound' of trauma to be caused by an extraordinary event, trauma theory proposes a model of the traumatised subject that reintroduces into the Humanities a distinction between the 'normal' and the 'pathological': 'One has either been present at or has "been" traumatized by a terrible event or one has not.' 13 This dichotomy runs counter both to a fundamental tenet of psychoanalytic thinking that rejects these categories and understands forms of psychic disturbance as a continuum, and to the model developed in cultural theory of the 'de-centred subject ... engaged in processes of (fear), desire and meaningmaking over which it lack(s) full conscious control'. 14 Secondly, in ascribing the sole cause of trauma to an event in the external world, the significance of its mediation in the internal world and the meanings conferred on it by the subject afterwards is evaded: this is to 'attribute all badness to the world outside' at the expense of recognising, for example, aggression and violence within the subject. 15 Thirdly, the emphasis placed by trauma theory on 'the role of the listener or witness in the bringing to consciousness of previously unassimilated memory' is doubly problematic: it contradicts another of its central tenets, namely the neuroscientific pathology of dissociation that happens to a 'passive victim', 16 whilst also inscribing a privileged position and role to the trained cultural analyst. that 'an event, or events, in the past causes the symptoms in the present'; 30 that 'trauma is created by conflict, but more likely to be manifested in a period of peace'; 31 and that the provision of public services offering treatment for trauma in the postconflict present furthers the restoration of psychological healing whilst also addressing the 'psychosocial dimensions' of peace-building, thereby enabling both traumatized individuals and the wider society to move on from the past. The associated 'medicalisation' of distress is especially pernicious in a context of political violence since it 'pathologises a social phenomenon': 38 Those diagnosed as suffering from PTSD are constructed as 'passive victims overwhelmed by their experiences in the past' 39 and offered a therapeutic solution that avoids, and displaces attention from, political considerations of responsibility for violence, of justice, and of overcoming divisions in the making of an agreed future society.
Hamber argues that the 'concept (of) trauma and PTSD specifically, drives thinking towards homogeneity, as if all experiences of violence have the same outcome or need the same treatment'. 40 In Northern Ireland as in other 'post-conflict' societies, the discourse of trauma works performatively 'to change the personal and local language of suffering; that is, victims start to express themselves in medical language ("I am suffering from PTSD") rather than express how they really feel'. 41 According to Gilligan, the professionalisation of care associated with PTSD undermines the 'informal social support networks' grounded in 'protective community bonds' that previously provided adaptive resources to deal with and absorb the effects of violence; 42 and sustained what might now be described as resilience. 43 Hamber calls instead for close attention to 'the context of violence (and) its cultural specificities', 44 including the ways political violence works to alter and destroy existing 'individual and community meaning systems' as well as social bonds and relations. 45 Understanding the 'distinctive political, social and cultural meanings, and, thus, specific impacts' of 'different violent and political incidents' is therefore essential. 46 This requires recognition of those affected as 'active agents who are involved in giving meaning to their experiences' 47 and engaging in forms of 'social action' in pursuit of their own goals according to their own articulated needs and desires. HTR discovered popular support for the idea that those telling their stories, 'if listened to empathically could experience a degree of healing'; as well as concerns that 'recounting painful experiences could ... "reopen old wounds"'. 50 This discourse influenced the subsequent development of storytelling practices and 'the recording of trauma memories from conflict'. 51 For example, the film-maker and founder of the Prisons Memory Archive, Cahal McLaughlin, while sensibly cautious about 'claim(ing) any healing potential' for his own films, has situated his practice in relation to a range of critical writing on trauma and 'reparative memory' which includes that of Caruth and Laub. 52 It has also found its way into policy formulations on 'dealing with the past', such as the Report of the Consultative Group on the Past, which recommends storytelling as 'a process designed to facilitate individual and societal healing and to break the cycle of conflict'. 53 Running through these debates, and widely deployed in media reportage and popular understandings of traumatic experience, is another conventional assumption:
that of 'closure'. The desire for closure, in the sense of a wished for ending to emotional distress, is routinely expressed by those harmed by political violence, whether sought through storytelling or, alternatively, through campaigning for truth and justice in unresolved cases of killing from the conflict. 54 In the words of Gillian Object-relations theory 'holds out a perspective for the construction of a psychoanalysis that takes account of social relations', 60 and demonstrates 'a potential willingness to investigate psychic life in terms of the particularity of (actual) social relationships ... located historically within a specific culture'. 61 Embodied emotional and psychic life is understood as a dynamic process occurring within a person's inner world, largely unconscious, peopled by imagined objects or 'imagos'
with which the self interacts to establish various kinds of internal object relations.
These imagined objects partly derive their character from, but also affect perceptions of, external others and social situations, which are experienced according to internal Whatever the nature of the event ... eventually (the survivor) comes to make sense of it in terms of the most troubled and troubling of the relationships between the objects that are felt to inhabit his internal world. That way the survivor is at least making something recognisable and familiar out of the extraordinary, giving it a meaning (original ellipsis). 62 Hamber's thinking about extreme political violence, trauma, and victimhood is also rooted in object-relations theory derived from his training as a clinical psychologist and psychotherapist, as this encountered a 'tidal wave of emotion' in local meetings with victims of apartheid-era violence whilst preparing for the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1995. 63 The object-relations model complements and may be integrated into cultural and historical approaches to feeling and emotion, and opens up ways of thinking that understand these phenomena as a medium through which the interconnections between internal and external worlds are produced, regulated, contested and transformed. 68 But what Williams calls these 'social experiences in solution' can be discerned in the 'precipitated' form of cultural representations, the stories and images that we make of our lived experience. 69 Williams here identifies a gap between lived experience and its representation, and invites further reflection on how this is mediated and how emotions 'in solution' might be accessed. Critical attention can then focus on the quality of the precipitating voices, the forms they create to articulate 'embryonic' or 'emergent' new structures of feeling, with their limitations and achievements, and the social positions from which they speak. However, caught in a tension between embodiment and signification, our own affective experience is not self-evident and transparent but requires 'emotional labour' to understand and interpret what goes on inside, in the internal world, at the 'boundaries between "bodily space" and social space"'. 79 We discover, reflect on, and may attempt to articulate, what it is that we feel on the basis of a 'vocabulary of emotion'. 80 These words have, as the much-quoted anthropologist William Reddy puts it, a 'unique capacity to alter what they "refer" to or what they "represent"'; so, for example, 'the sensation of fear' may be conjured, or altered, by 'acts of speaking (or writing) one's fear'. 81 'As the words change, so too does the meaning of the emotion within a particular culture'. 82 The prevailing languages of emotion are imbricated with social norms and what Claire Langhamer calls 'dominant emotional codes and standards', which also form and shift historically in relation to changing conditions of life. 83 For Barbara Rosenwein, 'emotions have social functions and follow social rules', providing 'tools with which we manage social life' and conduct our relations with others. 84 She proposes the concept of 'emotional communities' to refer to the 'systems of feeling' that are active within social institutions and networks -'families, neighbourhoods, parliaments, guilds, monasteries, parish church (congregations)'-and which establish 'what these communities (and the individuals within them) define and assess as valuable or harmful to them; the evaluations that they make about others' emotions; the nature of the affective bonds between people that they recognize; and the modes of emotional expression that they expect, encourage, tolerate and deplore'. 85 Rosenwein argues that multiple emotional communities jostle and overlap within a society at any particular historical moment, constituting conflicting and sometimes contradictory common sense about the meaning and value of an emotion such as hatred; 86 and that 'people move (and moved) continually from one such community to another', adjusting their emotional expression accordingly. 87 This can be seen in Roper's analysis of the emotional survival skills that soldiers exercised during the First World War, which demonstrates how 'models of care' derived from their 'closest emotional bonds' within the family, particularly between mothers and sons, provided soldiers with 'emotional reference points' to draw on in their relationships within the institution of the Army at the front. 88 In an analysis that suggests how we might think concretely about Gilligan's 'informal support networks' and the resilience of those affected by the violence of the Troubles, Roper explores how soldiers tried to 'keep their spirits up', took care of each other, and coped with 'emotions like fear, anger, love and loss', which were shaped 'according to particular class and family cultures and idioms of expression'. 89 In handling feelings such as loss or love within social life, then, while we 'exercise ... emotional agency', we are not free agents. 90 Rather, we situate our own feelings in relation to cultures -or 'structures of feeling', used by both Rosenwein and Roper 91 -that shape patterns, expectations and models of experience. Emotional communities and cultures with specific locations in time and space develop particular ways of organising felt subjectivity, enabling us to recognise and communicate our emotional lives and interactions. On this basis our emotions are felt to be validated by, or to be transgressive of, cultural norms and values. Thus they have political implications. Handled in culturally sanctioned ways according to 'feeling-rules' that govern their expression or concealment, emotions are subject to repression, restraint and sanctioned release. 92 The gendering of such rules is demonstrated in Lucy Noakes' study of 'the management of female grief' in anticipation of, and response to, air raids on Britain during the Second World War. 93 This explores how a long-established 'emotional economy ... emphasiz(ing) stoicism and reticence' as the '(desirable) codes of behaviour' for men was extended to women as a means of curtailing the 'disruptive' and 'destabiliz(ing)' impact of mass bereavement on national morale and the war effort. 94 In wartime British culture, the requirements of emotional restraint, whether internally adopted through engagement with popular cultural texts or externally imposed by national and local state authorities, policed public expressions of emotion whilst constituting the private sphere as the location of greater licence, and responsibility, in emotional life. However, the negotiation of felt experience between people and social institutions is never only about emotional control, but also involves the social and political 'evoking' of emotion, as in the case of fear, which Bourke shows to have been incited historically in relation to shifting social anxieties from the afterlife of hell to terrorism. 95 Emotions may be felt collectively, even contagiously, by people in social groups undergoing a common experience, including those recognized as a 'traumatized 13 community'; and such collectivities themselves become the object of emotional management, as in official strategies for avoiding panic in crowd control. 96 Yet varied and unexpected emotional reactions also arise within groups, which are never homogeneous;
as can be seen in the diverse expressions of happiness, fortitude, and a sense of reassurance perversely derived from the recognition that other people are also worried, reported in response to the danger of bombings during the Blitz. 97 This leads Bourke to conclude that, far from belonging to any pre-given collective entity such as a class, emotions work to 'align people with others', thereby constituting them as a social group (and, as Sara Ahmed argues, organising their felt relation to others); 98 so 'fear places people', sorting them into positions within a social hierarchy. 99 The question for historians This is not to advocate 'history' at the expense of 'psychology', and I want to end by arguing for the retention of a psychoanalytic dimension to the investigation of emotional histories, rooted in the object-relations tradition. Feelings and emotions are, as the social historian Michael Roper puts it, 'always relational', 116 in that they arise and make themselves felt in relation to others, both real and imagined, and are mediated, in psychoanalytic terms, through internal object relations that figure modes of intersubjectivity and colour with feeling our social and political relationships. For object-relations theorists, recovery from deeply disturbing experience and the nurturing of psychic health depends upon capacities for 'reparation' being mobilized to think about the meanings and emotions attached to internal objects, to undo defensive splitting within the psyche, and to integrate contradictory emotions and conflicting aspects of the self within a less polarized inner world. The work of reparation is strengthened by the 'introjection', or taking in, of such capacities where they are encountered in social life. This, as well as the perception of discrepancies between anticipations derived from the internal world and the complex realities of the external social world, enables 'something new to happen' within both psychic and social reality. 117 Work by historians of emotion has already begun to explore how concepts and insights from object relations theory may be used in historical interpretation of emotional formations and dynamics; as in my previous thinking about 'reparative remembering' as a means of undoing 'defensive' modes of subjective composure of the self, and in Roper's reading of soldiers' writing as a means to 'get rid of disturbing feelings' or as attempts at 'containing' otherwise 'nameless dread'. 118 There is scope for further work of this kind, to explore how emotional transformations in self and society are brought about after war and conflict, and to illuminate the complex and challenging meanings of 'moving on'. 
